Tuesday, September 30, 2014

Technical vs Substantive Objections: What difference does it make?


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Neil Garfield posted: "For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counse"
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Technical vs Substantive Objections: What difference does it make?

by Neil Garfield
For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don't be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don't admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.
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Lawyers and homeowners are upset. Their objections to the very soft proof offered by parties attempting to foreclose on property are met with instant skepticism and usually, even if the objection is sustained, the case ends up at a foreclosure sale. The reason is simple. Judges are people. They come to the bench with personal experiences, education, training, and active litigation experience. Like all professionals these experiences shape their perceptions and "leanings" (not bias). Underneath everything is the question in their mind: "What difference does it make?" If the result is going to be the same regardless of what technical objections or narrative offered by the homeowner, the Judge is annoyed with what appears to be an obvious waste of time caused by due process requirements. Yes there is a certain amount of prejudgment by Judges and the recent disclosures exposed by Tom Ice in the 4th DCA clearly show that Judges are deciding cases based upon policy decisions rather than the merits of the case.
But that is only part of the problem. The real problem is that Judges are not open to an alternative narrative --- and that is because in most cases they won't allow the presentation of evidence that would give them that alternative narrative.
The underlying narrative is simple, in the mind of most judges: The borrower received a loan, signed papers, breached the terms expressed on those papers, and now faces the ultimate penalty --- forfeiture of his home. While this may lead some judges to show compassion toward the homeowners, regardless of how they got into the mess, our system requires the employment of remedies like foreclosure. You put up collateral and you don't pay --- you lose the collateral. This narrative is axiomatic in the mind of most Judges because they have not been educated as to the unique, faulty, fraudulent scheme devised by Wall Street in creating availability of a large pool of money vastly in excess of the entire GDP of the U.S. economy.
The current narrative also places a burden of proof on the homeowner which should not be enforced. If the homeowner denies the loan, the consideration, and the truth of the matters asserted on the papers he signed, then the burden should be on the foreclosing party. This is particularly true where the evidence of the fraud is in the sole care, custody and control  of the foreclosing party, their co-venturers, predecessors or successors.
This also accounts for the game of musical chairs played by the banks where servicers are changing every year or even more often, Trustees are changing, and the Plaintiffs are continually changing. They are then able to say that they can't find the papers and only have "electronic copies" which is basically a way of saying we were negligent nor fraudulent. That bothers a lot of Judges but they are not getting the narrative required to answer the fundamental question: "What difference does it make?"
Placing the burden of proof on someone who can only prove their point from the records of the party suing him is unfair. Not enforcing discovery demands is outright ridiculous --- but only if an alternate narrative is developed. We are now preparing extensive motions and memoranda declaring the homeowner's theory of the case. This shows point by point why each interrogatory, request to produce and request for admission is essential to the defense theory of the case. Of course in order to do that you need to understand your own narrative. Many lawyers focus in on a magic bullet, like the lack of an assignment of the mortgage. They fail to submit written argument that states the difference between the note, which does not need an assignment, and the mortgage which does need an assignment. That failure undermines their credibility.
Laying out your theory of the case gives the Judge something that he or she didn't have before --- an answer to what difference it makes. Challenge the forecloser on the substantive basis that there is a complete absence of any transactions upon which the forecloser relies. The narrative goes on to show that the illusion of a standard mortgage transaction was indeed created; but the reality is bait and switch --- that the loan was in most cases funded with the proceeds of civil theft from Pension funds and other "investors" on Wall Street. And the conclusion is that every foreclosure forces losses onto the real lenders and forces the bad loans into an empty trust; and that each foreclosure continues the fraud on both the real lenders and the borrower.
Such blanket assertions are confronted with the perception that the allegations are false and counter-intuitive. But when you continue your narrative showing that the Trusts were merely an illusion covering up the theft from the investors or theft from the trust which issued an IPO of bonds but received nothing in return. No holder in due course is alleged because there isn't any. THAT is something that DOES bother a lot of Judges ("Why don't they allege the status of holder in due course, which would eliminate the borrower's defenses? who is the holder in due course?").
Your narrative should address directly the "free house" analysis used by the banks. There is no such thing. Even in states like Florida with its extensive homestead protection, the real creditor is entitled to a judgment on the debt even if the note and mortgage were fabricated or defective. Foreclosure is not an option until the homestead exemption is lifted but whenever someone wants to sell their home they will encounter the Judgment that must be paid with interest at statutory rates. So there is no free house, especially in most other states where the homestead exemption is virtually nothing.
But you still must issue a narrative that explains why these banks with brands and reputations dating back 150 years would come to court and allege they are a creditor or have rights to sue on behalf of a creditor. The answer is the money. They make money doing it. They are able to do it without the real lenders knowing about the status of the loan or that it is in foreclosure or could be modified and they recover servicer advances as well as making a profit on "REO" property that should be in the name of the Trust or the investors but usually doesn't work out that way. It's the perfect crime. Imagine stealing money from a safe. You would be caught right? But not if you had a signed document that said the owner of the safe can't look inside. That is what the PSA and Prospectus do.
The plain fact is that the originator whose name was put on the note and mortgage and other settlement documents was never the lender and simply used the money of the investors without regard to the existence of the trust. Only they have the proof and if they could prove otherwise they would have done so in the thousands of cases where I have asserted these issues. instead they enter into "too good to be true" settlement agreements under strict confidentiality --- specifically naming me as one person to whom no information can be given.
Ask anyone who represents conventional banks in conventional loans. If they were foreclosing, as I have done for many banks and other entities, if the defendant denied the transaction, I would have gladly put an end to their nonsense by showing that each element of the transaction was satisfied. End of case. The only reason I would extend litigation time into years and fighting or avoiding the true narrative is because the narrative I alleged in the foreclosure case is not as strong as I would need to say "case over." In fact, if I learned that there were no transactions as alleged by the bank I represented, I would be ethically bound to resign, withdraw and potentially inform the Court that my reasons consist of the code of professional conduct.
That is why this fight is only half over. Eventually the true narrative will get into the mainstream and lawyers who want to protect their license to practice law will be careful about what they allege and what they try to prove. In the meantime, lawyers should challenge the presumptions in the burden of proof on the grounds that the denial requires the bank or servicer to prove the loan and every transaction upon which they rely, on the basis that the information and data that would prove or disprove defendant's narrative of the case is solely within their care custody and control, and that it does make a difference because the way they did it, there is no possible direct foreclosure although a judgment lien could be converted into a foreclosure if the laws allowed it. Only this would remove the servicer from claiming authority as a servicer, and remove the trustee from claiming that the trust owns anything except foreclosed property.
Only then will the Pension funds the homeowners be able to connect, when they realize that the trust and the trust provisions were ignored, requiring a new infrastructure excluding the old servicers and putting in servicers, receivers, trustees on deed of trust that are actually empowered to act based upon policy set by the Pension funds and the homeowners. When that happens foreclosures will grind to a virtual halt, the economy will be stimulated beyond anything in the past, and the recovery from the depression caused by the banks will be over.
Neil Garfield | September 22, 2014 at 11:24 am | Categories: foreclosure | URL: http://wp.me/p7SnH-6su
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Thank you Neil Garfield! The Devil is in the Details — The Mortgage Cannot Be Enforced, Even If the Note Can Be Enforced



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The Devil is in the Details — The Mortgage Cannot Be Enforced, Even If the Note Can Be Enforced

by Neil Garfield
Cashmere v Department of Revenue
For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don't be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don't admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.
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Editor's Introduction: The REAL truth behind securitization of so-called mortgage loans comes out in tax litigation. There a competent Judge who is familiar with the terms of art used in the world of finance makes judgements based upon real evidence and real comprehension of how each part affects another in the "securitization fail" (Adam Levitin) that took us by surprise. In the beginning (2007) I was saying the loans were securitized and the banks were saying there was no securitization and there was no trust.
Within a short period of time (2008) I deduced that there securitization had failed and that no Trust was getting the money from investors who thought they were buying mortgage backed securities and therefore the Trust could never be a holder in due course. I deduced this from the complete absence of claims that they were holders in due course. Whether they initiated foreclosure as servicer, trustee or trust there was no claim of holder in due course. This was peculiar because all the elements of a holder in due course appeared to be present because that is what was required in the securitization documents --- at least in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement and prospectus.
If the foreclosing party was a holder in due course they would merely have to show what the securitization required --- a purchase in good faith of the loan documents for value without knowledge of any of borrower's defenses.  This would bar virtually any defense by the borrower and allow them to get a judgment on the note and a foreclosure based upon the auxiliary contract for collateral --- the mortgage. But they didn't allege that for reasons that I have described in recent articles --- they could not, as part of their prima facie case, prove that any party in their "chain" had funded or paid any money for the loan.
After analyzing this case, consider the possibility that there is no party in existence who has the power to foreclose. The Trust beneficiaries clearly don't have that right. The Trust doesn't either because they didn't pay anything for it. The Trustee doesn't have that right because it can only assert the rights of the Trust and Trust beneficiaries. The servicer doesn't have that right because it derives its authority from the Pooling and Servicing Agreement which does not apply because the loan never made it into the Trust. The originator doesn't have the right both because they never loaned the money and now disclaim any interest in the mortgage.
Then consider the fact that it is ONLY the investors who have their money at risk but that they failed to get any documentation securing their "involuntary loans." They might have actions to recover money from the borrower, but those actions are far from secured, and certainly subject to numerous defenses. The investors are barred from enforcing either the note or the mortgage by the terms of the instruments, the terms of the PSA and the rule of law. They are left with an unsecured common law right of action to get what they can from a claim for unjust enrichment or some other type of claim that actually reflects the true facts of the original transaction in which the borrower did receive a loan, but not from anyone represented at the loan closing.
Now we have the Cashmere case. The only assumption that the Court seems to get wrong is that the investors were trust beneficiaries because the court was assuming that the Trust received the proceeds of sale of the bonds. This does not appear to be the case. But the case also explains why the investors wanted to take the position that they were trust beneficiaries in order to get the tax treatment they thought they were getting. So here we have the victims and perpetrators of the fraud taking the same side because of potentially catastrophic results in tax treatment --- potentially treating principal payments as ordinary income. That would reduce the return on investment below zero. They lost.
I have changed fonts to emphasize certain portion of the following excerpts from the Case decision:
"Cashmere's investments merely gave Cashmere the right to receive specific cash flows generated by the assets of the trust at specific times. But if the REMIC trustee failed to pay Cashmere according to the terms of the investment, Cashmere had no right to sell the mortgage loans or the residential property or any other asset of the trust to satisfy this obligation. Cf. Dep't of Revenue v. Sec. Pac. Bank of Wash. Nat'/ Ass'n, 109 Wn. App. 795, 808, 38 P.3d 354 (2002) (deduction allowed because mortgage companies transferred ownership of loans to taxpayer who could sell the oans in event of default). Cashmere's only recourse would be to sue the trustee for performance of the obligation or attempt to replace the trustee. The trustee's successor would then take legal title to the underlying securities or other assets of the related trust. At no time could Cashmere take control of trust assets and reduce them to cash to satisfy a debt obligation. Thus, we hold that under the plain language of the statute, Cashmere's investments in REMICs are not primarily secured by mortgages or deeds of trust.
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"Cashmere argues that the investments are secure because the trustee is obligated to protect the investors' interests and the trustee has the right to foreclose. But, this is not always the case. The underlying mortgages back all of the tranches, and a trustee must balance competing interests between investors of different tranches. Thus, a default in one tranche does not automatically give the holders of that tranche a right to force foreclosure. We hold that if the terms of the trust do not give beneficiaries an investment secured by trust assets, the trustee's fiduciary obligations do not transform the investment into a secured investment.
"In a 1990 determination, DOR explained why interest earned from investments in REMICs does not qualify for the mortgage tax deduction. see Wash. Dep't of Revenue, Determination No. 90-288, 10 Wash. Tax Dec. 314 (1990). A savings and loan association sought a refund of B&O taxes assessed on interest earned from investments in REMICs. The taxpayer argued that because interest received from investments in pass-through securities is deductible, interest received on REMICs
should be too. DOR rejected the deduction, explaining that with pass-through securities, the issuer holds the mortgages in trust for the investor. In the event of individual default, the issuer, as trustee, will foreclose on the property to satisfy the terms of the loan. In other words, the right to foreclose is directly related to homeowner defaults-in the event of default, the trustee can foreclose and the proceeds from foreclosure flow to investors who have a beneficial ownership interest in the underlying mortgage. Thus, investments in pass-through securities are "primarily secured by" first mortgages.
"By contrast, with REMICs, a trustee's default may or may not coincide with an individual homeowner default. So, there may be no right of foreclosure in the event a trustee fails to make a payment. And if a trustee can and does foreclose, proceeds from the sale do not necessarily go to the investors. Foreclosure does not affect the trustee's obligations vis-a-vis the investor. Indeed, the Washington Mutual REMIC here contains a commonly used form of guaranty: "For any month, if the master servicer receives a payment on a mortgage loan that is less than the full scheduled payment or if no payment is received at all, the master servicer will advance its own funds to cover the shortfall." "The master servicer will not be required to make advances if it determines that those advances will not be recoverable" in the future. At foreclosure or liquidation, any proceeds will go "first to the servicer to pay back any advances it might have made in the past." Similarly, agency REMICs, like the Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2000-38, guarantee payments even if mortgage borrowers default, regardless of whether the issuer expects to recover those payments. Moreover, the assets held in a REMIC trust are often MBSs, not mortgages.
"So, if the trustee defaults, the investors may require the trustee to sell the MBS, but the investor cannot compel foreclosure of individual properties. DOR also noted that it has consistently allowed the owners of a qualifying mortgage to claim the deduction in RCW 82.04.4292. But the taxpayer who invests in REMICs does not have any ownership interest in the MBSs placed in trust as collateral, much less any ownership interest in the mortgage themselves. By contrast, a pass-through security represents a beneficial ownership of a fractional undivided interest in a pool of first lien residential mortgage loans. Thus, DOR concluded that while investments in pass-through securities qualify for the tax deduction, investments in REMICs do not. We should defer to DOR's interpretation because it comports with the plain meaning of the statute.
"Moreover, this case is factually distinct. Borrowers making the payments that eventually end up in Cashmere's REMIC investments do not pay Cashmere, nor do they borrow money from Cashmere. The borrowers do not owe Cashmere for use of borrowed money, and they do not have any existing contracts with Cashmere. Unlike HomeStreet, Cashmere did not have an ongoing and enforceable relationship with borrowers and security for payments did not rest directly on borrowers' promises to repay the loans. Indeed, REMIC investors are far removed from the underlying mortgages. Interest received from investments in REMICs is often repackaged several times and no longer resembles payments that homeowners are making on their mortgages.
"We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that Cashmere's REMIC investments are not "primarily secured by" first mortgages or deeds of trust on nontransient residential real properties. Cashmere has not shown that REMICs are secured-only that the underlying loans are primarily secured by first mortgages or deeds of trust. Although these investments gave Cashmere the right to receive specific cash flows generated by first mortgage loans, the borrowers on the original loans had no obligation to pay Cashmere. Relatedly, Cashmere has no direct or indirect legal recourse to the underlying mortgages as security for the investment. The mere fact that the trustee may be able to foreclose on behalf of trust beneficiaries does not mean the investment is "primarily secured" by first mortgages or deeds of trust.
Editor's Note: The one thing that makes this case even more problematic is that it does not appear that the Trust ever paid for the acquisition or origination of loans. THAT implies that the Trust didn't have the money to do so. Because the business of the trust was the acquisition or origination of loans. If the Trust didn't have the money, THAT implies the Trust didn't receive the proceeds of sale from their issuance of MBS. And THAT implies that the investors are not Trust beneficiaries in any substantive sense because even though the bonds were issued in the name of the securities broker as street name nominee (non objecting status) for the benefit of the investors, the bonds were issued in a transaction that was never completed.
Thus the investors become simply involuntary direct lenders through a conduit system to which they never agreed. The broker dealer controls all aspects of the actual money transfers and claims the amounts left over as fees or profits from proprietary trading. And THAT means that there is no valid mortgage because the Trust got an assignment without consideration, the Trustee has no interest in the mortgage and the investors who WERE the original source of funds were never given the protection they thought they were getting when they advanced the money. So the "lenders" (investors) knew nothing about the loan closing and neither did the borrower. The mortgage is not enforceable by the named "originator" because they were not the lender and they did not close as representative of the lenders.
There is no party who can enforce an unenforceable contract, which is what the mortgage is here. And the note is similarly defective --- although if the note gets into the hands of a party who DID PAY value in good faith without knowledge of the borrower's defenses and DID GET DELIVERY and ACCEPT DELIVERY of the loans then the note would be enforceable even if the mortgage is not. The borrower's remedy would be to sue the people who put him into those loans, not the holder who is suing on the note because the legislature adopted the UCC and Article 3 says the risk of loss falls on the borrower even if there were defenses to the loan. The lack of consideration might be problematic but the likelihood is that the legislative imperative would be followed --- allowing the holder in due course to collect from the borrower even in the absence of a loan by the so-called "originator."
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Friday, September 26, 2014

FINALLY: Thank you Neil Garfield, Levitin, and Yves Smith, for clearing this up! – TRUST=EMPTY PAPER BAG

 THE TRUTH ABOUT THAT TRUST THAT PURPORTEDLY HOLDS YOUR MORTGAGE LOAN!
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Neil Garfield posted: "Living Lies Narrative Corroborated by Increasing Number of Respected Economists It has taken over 7 years, but finally my description of the securitization process has taken hold. Levitin calls it "securitization fail." Yves Smith agrees. Bottom li"
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Levitin and Yves Smith – TRUST=EMPTY PAPER BAG

by Neil Garfield
Living Lies Narrative Corroborated by Increasing Number of Respected Economists
It has taken over 7 years, but finally my description of the securitization process has taken hold. Levitin calls it "securitization fail." Yves Smith agrees.
Bottom line: there was no securitization, the trusts were merely empty sham nominees for the investment banks and the "assignments," transfers, and endorsements of the fabricated paper from illegal closings were worthless, fraudulent and caused incomprehensible damage to everyone except the perpetrators of the crime. They call it "infinite rehypothecation" on Wall Street. That makes it seem infinitely complex. Call it what you want, it was civil and perhaps criminal theft. Courts enforcing this fraudulent worthless paper will be left with egg on their faces as the truth unravels now.
There cannot be a valid foreclosure because there is no valid mortgage. I know. This makes no sense when you approach it from a conventional point of view. But if you watch closely you can see that the "loan closing" was a shell game. Money from a non disclosed third party (the investors) was sent through conduits to hide the origination of the funds for the loan. The closing agent used that money not for the originator of the funds (the investors) but for a sham nominee entity with no rights to the loan --- all as specified in the assignment and assumption agreement. The note and and mortgage were a sham. And the reason the foreclosing parties do not allege they are holders in due course, is that they must prove purchase and delivery for value, as set forth in the PSA within the 90 day period during which the Trust could operate. None of the loans made it.
But on Main street it was at its root a combination pyramid scheme and PONZI scheme. All branches of government are complicit in continuing the fraud and allowing these merchants of "death" to continue selling what they call bonds deriving their value from homeowner or student loans. Having made a "deal with the devil" both the Bush and Obama administrations conscripted themselves into the servitude of the banks and actively assisted in the coverup. --- Neil F Garfield, livinglies.me
For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don't be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don't admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.
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John Lindeman in Miami asked me years ago when he first starting out in foreclosure defense, how I would describe the REMIC Trust. My reply was "a holographic image of an empty paper bag." Using that as the basis of his defense of homeowners, he went on to do very well in foreclosure defense. He did well because he kept asking questions in discovery about the actual transactions, he demanded the PSA, he cornered the opposition into admitting that their authority had to come from the PSA when they didn't want to admit that. They didn't want to admit it because they knew the Trust had no ownership interest in the loan and would never have it.
While the narrative regarding "securitization fail" (see Adam Levitin) seems esoteric and even pointless from the homeowner's point of view, I assure you that it is the direct answer to the alleged complaint that the borrower breached a duty to the foreclosing party. That is because the foreclosing party has no interest in the loan and has no legal authority to even represent the owner of the debt.
And THAT is because the owner of the debt is a group of investors and NOT the REMIC Trust that funded the loan. Thus the Trust, unfunded had no resources to buy or fund the origination of loans. So they didn't buy it and it wasn't delivered. Hence they can't claim Holder in Due Course status because "purchase for value" is one of the elements of the prima facie case for a Holder in Due Course. There was no purchase and there was no transaction. Hence the suing parties could not possibly be authorized to represent the owner of the debt unless they got it from the investors who do own it, not from the Trust that doesn't own it.
This of course raises many questions about the sudden arrival of "assignments" when the wave of foreclosures began. If you asked for the assignment on any loan that was NOT in foreclosure you couldn't get it because their fabrication system was not geared to produce it. Why would anyone assign a valuable loan with security to a trust or anyone else without getting paid for it? Only one answer is possible --- the party making the assignment was acting out a part and made money in fees pretending to convey an interest the assignor did not have. And so it goes all the way down the chain. The emptiness of the REMIC Trust is merely a mirror reflection of the empty closing with homeowners. The investors and the homeowners were screwed the same way.
BOTTOM LINE: The investors are stuck with ownership of a debt or claim against the borrowers for what was loaned to the borrower (which is only a fraction of the money given to the broker for lending to homeowners). They also have claims against the brokers who took their money and instead of delivering the proceeds of the sale of bonds to the Trust, they used it for their own benefit. Those claims are unsecured and virtually undocumented (except for wire transfer receipts and wire transfer instructions). The closing agent was probably duped the same way as the borrower at the loan closing which was the same as the way the investors were duped in settlement of the IPO of RMBS from the Trust.
In short, neither the note nor the mortgage are valid documents even though they appear facially valid. They are not valid because they are subject to borrower's defenses. And the main borrower defense is that (a) the originator did not loan them money and (b) all the parties that took payments from the homeowner owe that money back to the homeowner plus interest, attorney fees and perhaps punitive damages. Suing on a fictitious transaction can only be successful if the homeowner defaults (fails to defend) or the suing party is a holder in due course.
Just as with homeowner loans, student loans have a series of defenses created by the same chicanery as the false "securitization" of homeowner loans. LivingLies is opening a new division to assist people with student loan problems if they are prepared to fight the enforcement on the merits. Student loan debt, now over $1 Trillion is dragging down housing, and the economy. Call 520-405-1688 and 954-495-9867)
When I was working with Brad Keiser (formerly a top executive at Fifth Third Bank), he formulated, based upon my narrative, a way to measure the risk of bank collapse. Using a "leverage" ration he and I were able to accurately define the exact order of the collapse of the investment banks before it happened. In September, 2008 based upon the leverage ratios we published our findings and used them at a seminar in California. The power Point presentation is still available for purchase. (Call 520-405-1688 or 954-495-9867). You can see it yourself. The only thing Brad got wrong was the timing. He said 6 months. It turned out to be 6 weeks.
First on his list was Bear Stearns with leverage at 42:1. With the "shadow banking market" sitting at close to $1 quadrillion (about 17 times the total amount of all money authorized by all governments of the world) it is easy to see how there are 5 major banks that are leveraged in excess of the ratio at Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill Lynch et al.
The point of the article that I don't agree with at all is the presumption that if these banks fail the economy will collapse. There is no reason for it to collapse and the dependence the author cites is an illusion. The fall of these banks will be a psychological shock world wide, and I agree it will obviously happen soon. We have 7,000 community banks and credit unions that use the exact same electronic funds transfer backbone as the major banks. There are multiple regional associations of these institutions who can easily enter into the same agreements with government, giving access at the Fed window and other benefits given to the big 5, and who will purchase the bonds of government to keep federal and state governments running. Credit markets will momentarily freeze but then relax.
The truth is that the banks don't want to manage the properties, they don't need the house and in tens of thousands of cases (probably in the hundreds of thousands since the last report), they simply walk away from the house and let it be foreclosed for non payment of taxes, HOA assessments etc. In some of the largest cities in the nation, tens of thousands of abandoned homes (where the homeowner applied for modification and was denied because the servicer had no intention or authority to give it them) were BULL-DOZED  and the neighborhoods converted into parks.
The banks don't want the money and they don't want the house. If you offer them the money they back peddle and use every trick in the book to get to foreclosure. This is clearly not your usual loan situation. Why would anyone not accept payment in full?
What they DO want is a judgment that transfers ownership of the debt from the true owners (the investors) to the banks. This creates the illusion of ratification of prior transactions where the same loan was effectively sold for 100 cents on the dollar not by the investors who made the loan, but by the banks who sold the investors on the illusion that they were buying secured loans, Triple AAA rated, and insured. None of it was true because the intended beneficiary of the paper, the insurance money, the multiple sales, and proceeds of hedge products and guarantees were all pocketed by the banks who had sold worthless bogus mortgage bonds without expending a dime or assuming one cent of risk.
Delaying the prosecution of foreclosures is simply an opportunity to spread out the pain over time and thus keep investors buying these bonds. And they ARE buying the new bonds even though the people they are buying from already defrauded them by NOT delivering the proceeds fro the sale of the bonds to the Trust that issued them.
The brokers are back at it, as though they haven't caused enough damage. The bigger the "risk" on the loan the higher the interest rate to compensate for that risk of loss. The higher interest rates result in less money being loaned out to achieve the dollar return promised to investors who think they are buying RMBS issued by a REMIC Trust. So the investor pays out $100 Million, expects $5 million per year return, and the broker sells them a complex multi-tranche web of worthless paper. In that basket of "loans" (that were never made by the originator) are 10% and higher loans being sold as though they were conventional 5% loans. So the actual loan is $50 Million, with the broker pocketing the difference. It is called a yield spread premium. It is achieved through identity theft of the borrower's reputation and credit.
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