Showing posts with label United States Bankruptcy Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United States Bankruptcy Court. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 8, 2014

FRIGHTENING PLAY OF EVENTS! IF YOU ARE TRYING TO SAVE A PROPERTY, YOU SHOULD READ THIS CASE!


Court of Appeals of Texas,El Paso.

J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Appellant, v. DEL MAR PROPERTIES, L.P., Appellee.

No. 08–13–00065–CV.

Decided: August 26, 2014


Before McCLURE, C.J., RIVERA, and RODRIGUEZ, JJ. Robert F. Maris, Matthew W. Lindsey, for J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. Jeffrey S. Alley, Herbert Ehrlich, for Del Mar Properties, L.P.

OPINION
Appellant LP. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the beneficiary of a deed of trust for property located at 3820 Hueco Avenue, El Paso, Texas, 79903 (“the Property”), appeals a partial summary judgment and bench verdict on damages in favor of Appellee Del Mar Properties, L.P.—purchaser of the Property at a foreclosure sale. The trial court's summary judgment order held that the foreclosure sale was ineffective by virtue of a defect in the substitute trustee's deed conveying the Property to Del Mar. In two issues, Appellant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the damages order because the entire case had been previously removed to bankruptcy court by one of Appellant's co-defendants. Alternatively, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment on the issue of title. We vacate the trial court's damages judgment.

BACKGROUND
Del Mar purchased the Property at a public foreclosure sale in 2005 after Appellant, the beneficiary of a $40,000 deed of trust on the property, instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings. Almost four years after the sale, Del Mar filed suit against Appellant, GMAC Mortgage Corporation, and trustee Beverly Mitrisin, alleging that the deed transferring the Property was defective and misidentified the property sold. In April 2011, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Del Mar, finding that the defendants (1) failed to give proper notice of the foreclosure sale, (2) Del Mar purchased the property in good faith, (3) the foreclosure sale was a nullity, and (4) a corrected substitute deed issued by the defendants did not pass title to Del Mar.

In May 2012, defendant GMAC filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which counsel for Appellant brought to the trial court's attention in a motion for continuance on November 12, 2012. GMAC also filed a suggestion of bankruptcy the same day, informing the trial court that proceedings against it were stayed pursuant to an order of the bankruptcy court. A bench trial on the issue of damages had been set for November 19, 2012.

On November 16, 2012 at 1:42 p.m., GMAC filed a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1452 (West 2006) with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.1 The notice of removal purported to remove the entire state court action to bankruptcy court. That same day, at 1:00 p.m. Mountain time, GMAC filed its notice of removal with the state trial court. Later that day, at 3:16 p.m. local time, the state trial court issued an order nonsuiting GMAC from this civil action. The time at which Del Mar moved to non-suit GMAC is unclear. The order itself states that Del Mar moved to non-suit GMAC the previous day at 1:40 p.m. However, in a stipulation sent to this Court, both parties concede that Del Mar actually moved to non-suit GMAC at 1:40 p.m. on November 16, 2012.

On November 19, 2012, the trial court rendered a post-answer default judgment against Appellant after it failed to appear for the bench trial on damages. Appellant appealed. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas eventually subsequently issued an order remanding the cause to state court.

DISCUSSION
The fundamental question before this Court is whether GMAC's removal of this civil action to bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1452 without the explicit consent of the other parties divested the state trial court of jurisdiction as to all claims and parties pending remand. We hold that it did, and that the trial court's damages verdict as to Appellant was void.

Standard of Review
“Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.” Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.1993). We review questions of jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). Likewise, we review the existence of undisputed facts underpinning jurisdiction de novo. Id. Because the question of jurisdiction is fundamental, we may address it at any time, even sua sponte. Juarez v. Tex. Ass'n of Sporting Officials El Paso Chapter, 172 S.W.3d 274, 277 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.). Our jurisdiction extends only so far as the trial court's jurisdiction. Id. at 278. “If the trial court lacked jurisdiction, then an appellate court only has jurisdiction to set the judgment aside and dismiss the cause.” Id.

Effect of Non–Suit Stipulation on Jurisdiction
At the outset, we pause briefly to address the question of whether we may base our jurisdictional analysis on a mutual stipulation that contravenes purportedly erroneous language contained in a trial order that could have been corrected nunc pro tunc. Del Mar, in its brief, originally stated that it orally moved to non-suit GMAC on November 15, 2012 at 1:40 p.m., one day before GMAC purportedly removed the case to bankruptcy court. As such, Del Mar's initial position was that GMAC had been severed from the case before it effected removal, thereby leaving the rest of the parties behind in state court. However, after filing its brief, Del Mar filed a letter with this Court stating that the date indicated on the non-suit judgment was wrong; instead, Del Mar had orally non-suited GMAC on November 16, 2012 at 1:40 p.m., forty minutes after GMAC filed its notice of removal with the state trial court at 1:00 p.m. Both Del Mar and J.P. Morgan stipulated to this fact, noted that the November 15 date was a typographical error, and asked us to correct the trial order. In an order dated September 25, 2013, we accepted the parties' stipulation, but also noted that actual correction of the order could only be accomplished nunc pro tunc. Neither party filed for a judgment nunc pro tunc in the trial court prior to submission.

Although both parties maintain the November 15 date on the order was erroneous, we note that this “scrivener's error” is far from minor—it directly affects the scope of our jurisdictional analysis given this case's unique procedural posture. Because a non-suit is effective at the time it is made and not at the time an order is actually rendered, see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex.2010), the purportedly erroneous November 15 date on the order would conclusively establish that GMAC had been severed from the case prior to removal and that the trial court retained jurisdiction to proceed to judgment on the merits against Appellant. See Hills v. Hernandez, No. Civ.A. 98–1108, 1998 WL 241518, at *1 (E.D.La. May 12, 1998). The stipulation changes this timeline significantly.

Authority from our sister circuit in Texarkana seems to indicate that even where both parties agree that a date different from one on a judgment represents the truth, “we are constrained by the rules to determine our jurisdiction by reference to the date on which the judgment was signed-a party cannot confer or waive jurisdiction by consent or agreement.” Claxon v. (Upper) Lake Fork Water Control and Improvement Dist. No. 1, 220 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied). However, because jurisdiction is fundamental, we also possess the power and the duty not only to review pleadings, but also “evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” City of El Paso v. Granados, 334 S.W.3d 407, 410 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2011, no pet.).

Here, the parties are not attempting to confer jurisdiction on the court by stipulation where none would independently exist, but are instead stipulating to the existence of a fact germane to our assessment of jurisdiction. Best practices would dictate that a typographical error such as this one be corrected by filing for a judgment nunc pro tunc in the trial court. Nevertheless, we accept the stipulation as jurisdictional evidence and take it to be true. The validity of both the trial court's verdict and Del Mar's non-suit of GMAC hinges on whether the civil action in its entirety was previously removed from state court. As we explain below, removal was properly effectuated and any actions prior to remand were coram non judice.

Removal to Bankruptcy Court
The United States bankruptcy courts have broad, concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over claims that are “related to” pending Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Gehan Prop. II, Ltd. v. Integrated Performance Sys., Inc. (In re Performance Interconnect Corp.), Ch. 7 Case No. 06–34482–BJH–7, Adv. No. 07–3100, 2007 WL 2088281, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. July 19, 2007); see also 28 U.S.C .A. § 1334(b)(West 2006). “ ‘Related to’ jurisdiction exists if ‘the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.’ “ In re Performance Interconnect Corp., 2007 WL 2088281, at *4 [Internal citation omitted]. A party to a lawsuit in state court “may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action ․ to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending” if the district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334, which includes “related to bankruptcy” jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1452(a). The party seeking Section 1452 removal does not have to be the debtor seeking relief in bankruptcy court. Cal. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 103 (2nd Cir.2004). Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9027 governs the procedure for cases removed under Section 1452.

“Once a timely request is made in the Bankruptcy Court and a copy of the application for removal is filed in the District Court, removal is automatic.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Mahaney (In re Watson–Mahaney, Inc.), 70 B.R. 578, 580 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1987); see also Stewart Title Co. v. Street, 731 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ)(filing of petition for removal and bond sufficient to prove removal from state court). “[R]emoval becomes effective immediately and the State court has no power to proceed in the case unless and until the case is remanded.” Henke Grain Co. v. Keenan, 658 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); see also E.D. Systems Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 674 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir.1982); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(d)(West Supp.2014). “[J]urisdiction revests in the state court when the federal district court executes the remand order and mails a certified copy to the state court.” Quaestor Investments, Inc. v. State of Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex.1999). Any orders the state court issues prior to remand are void. Meyerland Co. v. F.D.I.C, 848 S.W.2d 82, 83 (Tex.1993); but see Stewart Title Co., 731 S.W.2d at 739 (trial court possessed power to continue contempt proceedings where underlying case had been removed to bankruptcy court).

Following removal, the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the action. Hen ke Grain Co., 658 S.W.2d at 346. The federal court must then assess whether it continues to possess some independent basis for jurisdiction. Frank v. Bear Stearns & Co., 128 F.3d 919, 921–22 (5th Cir.1997)(noting that party invoking federal jurisdiction bears burden of establishing diversity or federal question jurisdiction over state law claims). Where the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, or where there are equitable grounds under Section 1452, remand is the proper remedy. See id. (remanding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1452(b)(remand allowed on equitable grounds in bankruptcy court even where subject matter jurisdiction exists). Our review of the removal process vis-a-vis state trial court jurisdiction in cases such as this is procedural, not substantive. See Stewart Title Co., 731 S.W.2d at 739. The propriety of removal is a question entirely reserved to the federal courts. Id. We look only to the mechanics of the process to see if removal was properly effectuated from a procedural standpoint. Id. Where record evidence shows that a party properly followed removal procedures, we conclude state court jurisdiction has lapsed as a matter of law pending remand, even where no actual basis for continued federal jurisdiction ultimately exists in fact and the federal court remands. Id.

Del Mar argues that the scope of GMAC's Section 1452 removal was limited, and that removal was procedurally defective at its inception as against Appellant because Appellant never consented to the removal or otherwise indicated that it joined in removal. Consequently, Appellant remained in state court following GMAC's removal, and the default judgment rendered against Appellant in state court was valid. To our knowledge, the Fifth Circuit has not explicitly spoken on the issue of whether failure to join co-defendants in a Section 1452 removal is procedurally defective and fatal. Del Mar contends that the rule of unanimity applies to Section 1452, meaning that all defendants must consent before their removal from state court is procedurally effective under Fifth Circuit case law. See Orion Ref. Corp. v. Fluor Enter., Inc., 319 B.R. 480, 485–86 (E.D.La.2004); accord Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bunch, No. Civ.A. 00–2859, 2001 WL 87443, at *2 n. 9 (E.D.La. Jan. 30, 2001) (dicta). Countervailing Fifth Circuit case law cited by Appellant indicates that any party may remove any civil action to bankruptcy court without the consent of the other parties under Section 1452. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig.), No. H–01–3642, H–03–2345, 2004 WL 1237497, at * 5 (S.D.Tex. May 20, 2004)(mem. op. & order); In re Performance Interconnect Corp., 2007 WL 2088281, at *5 n. 5; Sommers v. Abshire, 186 B.R. 407, 409 (E.D.Tex.1995); see also In re Eagle Bend Development, 61 B.R. 451, 457 

(Bankr.W.D.La.1986). Our own research indicates that the majority of courts interpreting Section 1452 outside the Fifth Circuit, including the Southern District of New York, hold that unanimity is not required in order to remove the entire action. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 103; Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 763 F.2d 656, 660 (4th Cir.1985); Franck v. Sullivan (In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litigation), Nos. 02 Civ.3288(DLC), 03 Civ.6220(DLC), 03 Civ.6221(DLC), 03 Civ.6223(DLC), 03 Civ.6224(DLC), 2003 WL 22383090, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2003).; see also In re Mortgages, Ltd., 427 B.R. 780, 789 (D.Ariz.2010)(noting that broad removal powers consistent with Congressional intent to grant bankruptcy courts comprehensive jurisdiction over claims). Given the weight of this case law, we believe that non-consensual joinder of parties in a Section 1452 removal is permissible under the Bankruptcy Code.

“[T]he scope of what is removed from state court to the bankruptcy court is determined by the removal petition.” Princess Louise Corp. v. Pac. Lighting Leasing Co. (In re Princess Louise Corp.), 77 BR. 766, 771 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1987). This includes both parties and claims. Id. Determining removal with reference to the removal petition itself provides both the state and federal courts with certainty as to which claims have been removed, preserves federal supremacy over bankruptcy matters, and promotes judicial economy by allowing state courts to avoid descending beyond their expertise into the brambles of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Id. at 771.2 Where a properly noticed Section 1452 removal petition purports to remove an entire civil action rather than specific claims, the state courts are divested of jurisdiction until the federal court rules on the ultimate propriety of federal jurisdiction and remands. Id.

Here, GMAC's notice of removal purported to remove the entire civil action to bankruptcy court, which is permissible under Section 1452 and operative even without the consent of other parties. As such, for purposes of assessing jurisdiction, the state court was divested of jurisdiction the moment the notice of removal was filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court. The state court did not regain jurisdiction until the cause was remanded on March 5, 2013. Because the trial court's November 19, 2012, judgment was rendered after removal and prior to remand, the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and the judgment is void. Issue One is sustained.
Remaining Summary Judgment Claim

In Issue Two, Appellant urges us to reverse the trial court's adverse grant of summary judgment on the issue of title. Because we determine that the trial court's order on damages was void, there is no final judgment before us that disposes of all claims, parties, and issues. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex.2001). As such, the partial summary judgment order is interlocutory, and we may only review its merits when so authorized by statute. Having found that we lack any statutory basis for interlocutory review of the partial summary judgment order, we dismiss this issue for want of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
Having sustained Issue One, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this Court's opinion.

FOOTNOTES
1.  It is unclear from the time stamp whether the notice of removal was filed at 1:42 p.m. Eastern time or Mountain time. We assume the document was filed at 1:42 p.m. Eastern time, or 11:42 a.m. Mountain time, given that a copy of the federal notice of removal was attached to the state notice of removal, which was filed at 1:00 p.m. Mountain time.

2.  We recognize that this approach to removal creates an incentive for a defendant whose co-defendant is bankrupt to file a frivolous Section 1452 removal on the eve of trial in hopes of defeating the state court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the law on this issue is clear, and the state courts are not without redress in policing truly abusive behavior. Even where an entire civil action has been removed to bankruptcy court, the state trial court still possesses the power to hold contempt proceedings related to that litigation. See In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex.1997); Stewart Title Co., 731 S.W.2d at 739.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice.
- See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/tx-court-of-appeals/1676618.html#sthash.fuqiYFwM.dpuf



Wednesday, August 24, 2011

““Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that requires a writing signed by the grantor.” Ibanez, 458 Mass at 649. Deutsche had not received a written assignment of the mortgage from MERS prior to May 3, 2011. The fact that it had possession of the mortgage instrument did not render Deutsche the mortgagee and thus it lacked the power to sell the property.”


DEUTSCH LOSES AGAIN: POOL DID NOT RECEIVE LOAN

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TRANSFER TO POOL AFTER FORECLOSURE INITIATED: VOID

“ The fact that Deutsche had possession of the mortgage, however, is irrelevant to its status as mortgagee. While a promissory note endorsed in blank may be enforced by the party in possession of the note, this is not the case with a mortgage”
““Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that requires a writing signed by the grantor.” Ibanez, 458 Mass at 649. Deutsche had not received a written assignment of the mortgage from MERS prior to May 3, 2011. The fact that it had possession of the mortgage instrument did not render Deutsche the mortgagee and thus it lacked the power to sell the property.”
In re: SIMA SCHWARTZ, Chapter 7, Debtor.
SIMA SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff,
v.
HOMEQ SERVICING, AGENT FOR DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE and DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE, Defendants.
Case No. 06-42476-MSH, Adversary Proceeding No. 07-04098.
United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Central Division.
August 22, 2011.
David G. Baker, Boston, MA, for the plaintiff.
Christopher Matheson, Richard C. Demerle and Christopher Decosta, Michienzie & Sawin, LLC, Boston, MA, for both defendants.
Gary A. Barnes, Sarah-Nell Walsh, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
MELVIN S. HOFFMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.
After the plaintiff, Sima Schwartz, presented her case in chief during the first day of the trial in this adversary proceeding, upon oral motion of the defendants, HomEq Servicing and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, I granted judgment on partial findings in favor of the defendants on all counts of the complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c), made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Ms. Schwartz then moved for a new trial as a result of which judgment was vacated on count I of the complaint only.Schwartz v. HomEq Servicing (In re Schwartz), 2011 WL 1331963 (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2011). In count I, Ms. Schwartz alleges that the May 24, 2006 foreclosure sale of her home by Deutsche was invalid because Deutsche did not own the mortgage on the property at the relevant time.1 I reopened the trial so that the defendants could present their case with respect to that count, which they did on June 1, 2011. Based on the evidence and legal submissions presented by the parties, my findings of fact, conclusions of law and order are set forth below.
Jurisdiction and Standing
Core jurisdiction over this case is conferred upon the bankruptcy court by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G) and (O). See Atighi v. DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. (In re Atighi), 2011 WL 3303454, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2011). Ms. Schwartz’s standing to seek relief is based on her property interest in light of the alleged wrongful foreclosure. Brae Asset Fund, L.P. v. Kelly, 223 B.R. 50, 56 (D. Mass. 1998).
Legal Framework
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14 establishes the procedure for a mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage by exercise of the statutory power of sale. The statute provides that prior to a foreclosure sale a notice of the sale must appear weekly for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper either published in or generally circulated in the city or town where the property is located. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has recently clarified that a foreclosing mortgagee must hold the mortgage as of the date that the first notice of sale is published.U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 941 N.E.2d 40 (2011). If the party intending to foreclose the mortgage is not the original mortgagee, a typical state of affairs when a mortgage loan is owned by the trustee of a securitized pool of mortgage loans, then the foreclosing mortgagee must hold a valid assignment of the mortgage prior to publishing the first sale notice.
The Defendants’ Case
It is undisputed that Deutsche was not the original mortgagee of the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home, so it must prove that the mortgage was assigned to it prior to the date when the first foreclosure notice was published. As discussed in the memorandum and order on the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, while the evidence established that an assignment of the mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) to Deutsche was executed on May 23, 2006, the day before the foreclosure sale, this assignment, being well after the notice of foreclosure sale was first published, did not confer on Deutsche the power to foreclose on May 24. The Supreme Judicial Court in Ibanez,however, offered an alternative method for a party to acquire sufficient rights in a mortgage to qualify to foreclose:
Where a pool of mortgages is assigned to a securitized trust, the executed agreement that assigns the pool of mortgages, with a schedule of the pooled mortgage loans that clearly and specifically identifies the mortgage at issue as among those assigned, may suffice to establish the trustee as the mortgage holder.
Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 651.
With this in mind, the defendants introduced into evidence at trial all of the agreements tracking the transfer of Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan from its originator, First NLC Financial Services, LLC (“First NLC”), to Deutsche, complete with the necessary schedules of the pooled mortgage loans specifically identifying her mortgage as being among those transferred. The defendants argue that these agreements, together with other evidence introduced by them, establish that Deutsche was the holder of the mortgage well in advance of the first publication of the notice of sale.
At trial, Ronaldo Reyes, a Deutsche vice president, testified that he had management responsibility over the administration of the Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4 (the “Trust”) and that Deutsche had always been the trustee of the Trust. He testified that in his capacity as vice president he had access to the books and records of the Trust and was qualified to authenticate and testify about the documents admitted into evidence by the defendants. During the course of his testimony, Mr. Reyes authenticated executed copies of each of the agreements discussed below, and demonstrated that Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was included on the mortgage loan schedules attached as exhibits to several of the agreements. Mr. Reyes testified that each was used in the ordinary course of Deutsche’s business as trustee of the Trust.
The following documents were admitted into evidence: (i) the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home; (ii) the original promissory note executed by Ms. Schwartz, which Mr. Reyes noted was endorsed in blank by First NLC; (iii) the Amended and Restated Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement (the “Loan Purchase Agreement”) dated as of September 1, 2005 by and between Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital, Inc. (“MS Mortgage Capital”) and First NLC; (iv) the Assignment and Conveyance Agreement dated September 29, 2005, by and between First NLC and MS Mortgage Capital; (v) the Bill of Sale dated November 29, 2005 by and between MS Mortgage Capital and Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. (“MS ABS Capital”); and (vi) the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “PSA”) dated as of November 1, 2005 by and among MS ABS Capital, HomEq Servicing Corporation, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, First NLC, LaSalle Bank National Association and Deutsche. Mr. Reyes also testified regarding a custodial log that was admitted into evidence for the purpose of proving that Ms. Schwartz’s loan documents were in Deutsche’s custody prior to the date when the first notice of foreclosure sale was published.
Findings of Fact2
1. On July 22, 2005, Ms. Schwartz refinanced the mortgage loan on her property at 23 Sigel Street, Worcester, Massachusetts, executing a promissory note in the amount of $272,000 payable to First NLC and a mortgage securing her obligation under the note naming MERS, solely as nominee for First NLC, its successors and assigns, as mortgagee.
2. The mortgage, which was duly recorded at the Worcester District Registry of Deeds, includes the statutory power of sale under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch 183, § 21 which is invoked by reference to the statute and which permits a mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage by public auction sale of the property upon the mortgagor’s default in performance or breach of any conditions thereof.
3. On May 3, May 10 and May 17, 2006, a notice of foreclosure sale was published in the Worcester Telegram and Gazette stating that “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee,” the “present holder” of the mortgage, intended to foreclose the mortgage by public sale of Ms. Schwartz’s property on May 24, 2006.
4. On May 23, 2006, Liquenda Allotey, described as a vice president of MERS, executed an Assignment of Mortgage for the purpose of assigning the mortgage from MERS to “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee.”
5. Deutsche, in its capacity as trustee of the Trust,3 conducted the foreclosure sale as scheduled on May 24, 2006, bid in its mortgage debt and purchased the property.
6. In its answer, Deutsche admitted that a foreclosure deed conveying the property to itself was recorded on October 13, 2006. There has been no evidence presented of any subsequent conveyance of the property and hence I find that Deutsche remains the record owner of the Sigel Street property.
7. As she testified on the first day of trial, Ms. Schwartz continues to reside in the Sigel Street Property.
8. The original promissory note executed by Ms. Schwartz was endorsed in blank by an officer of First NLC.
9. The original mortgagee as identified in the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home was MERS, as nominee for First NLC, its successors and assigns.
10. In accordance with Section 2 of the Loan Purchase Agreement, First NLC agreed to sell “Mortgage Loans” to MS Mortgage Capital.
11. The Loan Purchase Agreement defines a “Mortgage Loan” as
An individual Mortgage Loan which is the subject of this Agreement, each Mortgage Loan originally sold and subject to this Agreement being identified on the applicable Mortgage Loan Schedule, which Mortgage Loan includes without limitation the Mortgage File, the Monthly Payments, Principal Prepayments, Liquidation Proceeds, Condemnation Proceeds, Insurance Proceeds, Servicing Rights and all other rights, benefits, proceeds and obligations arising from or in connection with such Mortgage Loan, excluding replaced or repurchased mortgage loans.
12. On September 29, 2005, by way of the Assignment and Conveyance Agreement, First NLC sold, transferred, assigned, set over and conveyed to MS Mortgage Capital “all right, title and interest of, in and to the Mortgage Loans listed on the Mortgage Loan Schedule attached hereto as Exhibit A.”
13. Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was listed on the exhibit attached to the Assignment and Conveyance Agreement.
14. First NLC, therefore, transferred all of its right, title and interest in Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan to MS Mortgage Capital on November 29, 2005.
15. By the Bill of Sale dated November 29, 2005, MS Mortgage Capital, as the “Seller,” transferred to MS ABS Capital “all the Seller’s right, title and interest in and to the Mortgage Loans described on Exhibit A attached hereto.”
16. Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was listed on Exhibit A to the Bill of Sale.
17. MS Mortgage Capital, therefore, transferred its entire interest in Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan to MS ABS Capital on November 29, 2005.
18. Section 2.01 of the PSA, which was dated November 1, 2005, provides that the MS ABS Capital, as “Depositor,”
concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof, hereby sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to [Deutsche] for the benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right, title and interest of the Depositor in and to the Trust Fund, and the Trustee, on behalf of the Trust, hereby accepts the Trust Fund.
19. The “Trust Fund” includes all of the mortgage loans listed on an attached mortgage loan schedule.
20. Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was listed on the mortgage loan schedule attached to the PSA.
21. While the PSA provides that the mortgage loans were transferred from MS ABS Capital to Deutsche, “concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof” on November 1, 2005, the Bill of Sale provides that MS ABS Capital did not acquire the mortgage loans until November 29, 2005. The November 2009 PSA indicates, however, that the transaction in which MS ABS Capital would transfer the loans to Deutsch, as trustee of the Trust, would not be consummated until November 29, 2005, which is defined as the “Closing Date.” Therefore, MS ABS Capital transferred Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan to Deutsche, as trustee of the Trust, on the Closing Date of November 29, 2005, which is the same date as the Bill of Sale by which MS ABS Capital acquired the loan from MS Mortgage Capital.
22. Section 2.01(b) of the PSA provides that if
any Mortgage has been recorded in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (“MERS”) or its designee, no Assignment of Mortgage in favor of the Trustee will be required to be prepared or delivered and instead, the applicable Servicer shall take all reasonable actions as are necessary at the expense of the applicable Originator to the extent permitted under the related Purchase Agreement and otherwise at the expense of the Depositor to cause the Trust to be shown as the owner of the related Mortgage Loan on the records of MERS for the purpose of the system of recording transfers of beneficial ownership of mortgages maintained by MERS.
23. Thus MS ABS Capital did not assign to Deutsche the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home in connection with the transaction through which it transferred Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan pursuant to the PSA.
24. In the chain of transactions by which Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan was sold, initially by First NLC to MS Mortgage Capital, next by MS Mortgage Capital to MS ABS Capital and finally by MS ABS Capital to Deutsche, the seller sold all of its right, title and interest in the mortgage loans being transferred. However, as the mortgage itself was originally in the name of MERS as mortgagee, and not First NLC, First NLC never held legal title to the mortgage and could not have transferred such title to MS Mortgage Capital. Consequently, neither MS ABS Capital nor Deutsche, as successors to First NLC and MS Mortgage Capital, obtained legal title to the mortgage. This is consistent with § 2.01 of the PSA quoted above.
25. As of November 29, 2005, the Closing Date defined in the PSA, MERS continued to hold legal title to the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home as nominee for First NLC, its successors and assigns.
26. MERS continued to hold legal title to the mortgage until May 23, 2006, when it assigned the mortgage to Deutsche.
27. The custodial log establishes that Deutsche received Ms. Schwartz’s mortgage loan documents, including the promissory note and mortgage instrument, on September 15, 2005 (presumably in anticipation of the November loan sale), and retained custody of these documents until March 27, 2006, when they were sent to HomEq. The custodial log indicates that the documents were sent to HomEq for servicing and lists the reason for the transfer as “foreclosure.” According to the custodial log, the loan documents were returned to Deutsche on May 24, 2006, the day of the foreclosure sale.
Conclusions of Law
In In re Marron, 2011 WL 2600543, at *5 (Bankr. D. Mass. June 29, 2011), I held that where a loan was secured by a mortgage in the name of MERS, even when the loan itself changed hands several times, MERS remained the mortgagee in its capacity as nominee for the original lender, its successors and assigns.4 As MERS was the mortgagee, it had the authority to assign the mortgage to the foreclosing entity. In this case too, while Ms. Schwartz’s loan passed from hand to hand, MERS remained the mortgagee throughout. While MERS held only bare legal title to the mortgage on behalf of Deutsche, the successor to First NLC, until it assigned the mortgage to Deutsche on May 23, 2006, only MERS had the authority to foreclose.
Having determined that MERS, and not Deutsche, held legal title to the mortgage on Ms. Schwartz’s home mortgage as of May 3, 2006, when the notice of the foreclosure sale of her home was first published, it follows that Deutsche did not have the right to exercise the statutory power of sale and to foreclose the mortgage. See, e.g., Novastar Mortgage, Inc. v. Safran, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 1124, 948 N.E.2d 917 (2011) (finding, in a post-foreclosure eviction proceeding, that the foreclosing entity had the burden to prove its title to the property by establishing that the mortgage had been assigned to it by MERS “at the critical stages of the foreclosure process.”). By publishing notice of the foreclosure sale when it was not the mortgagee, Deutsche failed to comply with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14, and thus its foreclosure sale is void. Ibanez, 438 Mass. at 646-47.5 A declaratory judgment to that effect shall enter on count I of the complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1. The complaint is unclear as to the relief Ms. Schwartz seeks as a result of the allegedly invalid foreclosure. In addition to the allegation that the defendants did not own the mortgage, Ms. Schwartz alleges that she was damaged by the foreclosure sale, which “was conducted fraudulently, in bad faith” and to her detriment. I previously found that Ms. Schwartz failed to produce any evidence of the defendants’ intent to defraud her. In addition, Ms. Schwartz failed to establish the extent of her damages or that the foreclosure sale was conducted in bad faith. Though Ms. Schwartz does not expressly request a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the foreclosure, based on the allegation of invalidity in the complaint, and the parties’ arguments in the course of trial, I will consider count I of the complaint to be a request for a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale was invalid.
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2. Any finding of fact which should more properly be considered a conclusion of law, and vice versa, shall be deemed as such.
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3. The documents pertaining to the foreclosure sale identify Deutsche as “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee” without identifying the trust.
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4. The sophisticated financial minds who wrought the MERS regime sought to simplify the process of repeatedly transferring mortgage loans by obviating the need and expense of recording mortgage assignments with each transfer. No doubt they failed to consider the possibility of a collapse of the residential real estate market, the ensuing flood of foreclosures and the intervention of state and federal courts. Professor Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University has observed “[t]he law of unintended consequences is when a simple system tries to regulate a complex system.” Alex Tabarrok, The Law of Unintended Consequences, Marginal Revolution (Jan. 24, 2008, 7:47 am), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2008/01/the-law-of-unin.html.
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5. Deutsche presented sufficient evidence to prove that either it or HomEq, its agent, had possession of both the Schwartz mortgage and promissory note as of May 3, 2011. The note was endorsed in blank, which gave Deutsche the right to enforce the note. The fact that Deutsche had possession of the mortgage, however, is irrelevant to its status as mortgagee. While a promissory note endorsed in blank may be enforced by the party in possession of the note, this is not the case with a mortgage. “Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that requires a writing signed by the grantor.” Ibanez, 458 Mass at 649. Deutsche had not received a written assignment of the mortgage from MERS prior to May 3, 2011. The fact that it had possession of the mortgage instrument did not render Deutsche the mortgagee and thus it lacked the power to sell the property.
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2 Responses

  1. Carie
    Like I said in a prior posting, every institution is conspiring to either protect the banks and their agents and “surrogates” from criminal liability outright, or to pretend their friends are noble captains of industry keeping us from a new Dark Ages…..

  2. GOVERNMENT COVER-UPS ON UNPRECEDENTED SCALE—AND YOU THINK THEY WON’T DO IT WITH THE “FAKE” MORTGAGES??? THINK AGAIN—AND KEEP FIGHTING!!!
    “…AMY GOODMAN: Under whose authority?
    MATT TAIBBI: Under the authority of the enforcement division. Now, this—there’s no legal authority to do this. And, you know, apparently, according to my sources, this was illegal. You can’t just unilaterally shred any government document, no matter how insignificant. And these are significant law enforcement investigatory files that they were unilaterally destroying…”


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